By KHALID AL DAKHEEL
In November 2014, US President Barack Obama sent a message to Iranian leader Ali Khamenei stressing the common interests of the US and Iran.
As stated by a US official, Obama assured the Iranian leadership that the US presence in Iraq was just for fighting Islamic State and the Iranian regime should facilitate this mission as it benefits it as well. (The New York Times, November 7, 2014)
It appears that the Iranians refused this American request, according to Washington Post (December 3, 2014).
It also reported that the victories that Iraq had achieved against IS last autumn were facilitated by Iran through air strikes against IS forces. Also, Hezbollah had sent fighters to Iraq.
According to this newspaper, all these facts indicate that Iran has its own military influence in Iraq.
US Secretary of State John Kerry, commenting on the military activity of Iran, said: “If it is basically limited to fight IS, its final result will be positive.”
What did Kerry mean by “limited”, which was preceded by an “if”; does it mean that Iranian military activity outside its borders is negative?
Analysing this statement, John Kirby, the Pentagon spokesman, said: “Our stand on Iran is the same as before. It is the same stand we have for any neighbouring country that fights against IS; we do not want to do anything that may fuel the sectarian strife in the country.” (Washington Post, same issue)
What both Kerry and Kirby said confirms that the Obama administration knows very well that the war against IS will have destructive sectarian dimensions if it is not handled carefully.
So, is the American administration taking any action to address this fear? Is it taking any step to correct the course of the war? Until now, the US administration has done the opposite.
The American administration wants to build a coalition with Iran in its war against IS, but it wants it to be an undeclared coalition built before reaching a nuclear agreement with Tehran. The relations between these two countries will be normalised on the basis of these two factors.
Obama believes that there are many benefits from this war. For one, it assures Iran that America wants to finish off its third enemy, after it got rid of the Taliban and Saddam Hussein.
The Iraqi administration headed by Haider Al Abadi, which is correcting the course of the government after it was guided by a sectarian agenda under Nouri Al Maliki, is involving both America and Iran in developments in Iraq.
This government accepts American and Iranian intervention in its war against IS, but at the same time it completely and publicly rejects any Arab intervention or support.
This indicates that Arabs, in the eyes of the current Iraqi government, are “Sunni”, while “Iranian” are “Shia allies”. The Iraqi government is partnering America, the non-Muslim actor, as it brought it to power. It has to accept an Iranian role as Iran is the only regional support for Iraq politically and ideologically.
After the US invasion of Iraq, that country has become an issue on which American and Iranian interests meet.
The current situation in Iraq is more or less transitional. The Kurds are waiting for an opportunity to announce their independence; the Shias refuse to share power, citing democratic principles; and the Americans and Iranians are waiting for the outcome of their nuclear talks.
The Iranian regime is fully aware of the challenges and opportunism of the Obama administration. America is allied with many Arab states that are against Iran, and at the same time it wants to ally with Iran but it cannot draw an official framework for this partnership.
The US administration is committed to the Iraqi government, which cannot survive without support from America and Iran. The Iranians are trying to leverage this in their negotiations with the Americans. They want Obama to get more involved in the Iraqi conflict.
This will only increase the sectarian strife, and that is what the Iranians want as it will boost their regime’s legitimacy in the eyes of its followers and strengthen its role as the protector of Shias in the region.
What is strange is that the Arab role in Iraq has been marginalised. That is because of the Iraqis, Americans and Iranians, but also because of the Arab countries, especially Saudi Arabia.
Stranger still is the marginal Arab role in the political strategy to fight terrorism, despite the fact that all Arab states are America’s partners in fighting IS and terrorism, as are the backbone of the coalition against the terrorist group.
Everybody is busy fighting IS; they rarely ask themselves how they will achieve this goal and what will come after that?
It is possible to defeat IS, but doing that with the help of the Americans, Shia militias and Iranian fighters will lead to a sectarian war across the region. That will be a situation worse than the IS threat. The American and Arab experiences with Al Qaeda in Afghanistan are the best proof of this. What has happened lately in Yemen also confirms these fears.
The takeover of Yemen by the Iranian-backed Houthis can establish another partnership between Washington and Tehran for fighting Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, especially on the southern borders of Saudi Arabia.
Foreign Policy, an American magazine, has predicted that the Houthi takeover of Yemen will lead to another war between Sunnis and Shias. Will America be Iran’s partner in fighting Sunnis in Yemen, as it is doing in Iraq and Syria?
This is most likely what has prompted the GCC countries to start taking decisions and measures against the Houthis, but they are pretty late.
There is no reason to remain silent on American politics in the region. It was the sole reason for terrorism in Afghanistan, which led to the US invasion of Iraq.
Later, silence on America’s actions led to the Syrian holocaust, with the regime under the protection of Russia and Iran.
There should not be silence on a policy that pushes the whole region towards religious wars and destruction just because Obama wants a deal with Iran.
The author is an academic, a columnist and a political analyst
