By Dr Hasan Jawhar
The rapid development of events in Yemen imposed a certain course of action to deal with the country’s different political ideologies and turn the page on the past, taking into account current regional and international events.
The GCC countries decided on this course of action for reasons of utmost importance. Yemen is the backyard of the Gulf and the Arabian Peninsula. In addition, the political, tribal and sectarian components of the country’s crisis have a regional dimension.
Gulf States, especially Saudi Arabia, bet on a losing horse in the past months, either because they didn’t look beyond the daily events or because of political calculations that went beyond Yemen’s borders. In both cases, the winds of change altered a lot of equations. Even the Gulf initiative, which slowed down the transition of power under the auspices of the United Nations, was buried among the ruins of Aden, the last stronghold of Yemen’s President, Abdrabuh Mansur Hadi.
The new reality of Yemen must be contained and sponsored, despite the fragility of the front of Hadi and despite the media halo given to him. A political solution is still viable; there is a role for the Gulf that can be invested in. However, attempts to turn back aggravated the complicated situation and perhaps led the Yemeni people to civil conflict.
The complex security situation did not prevent the continuation of the dialogue between the various Yemeni forces, Houthis, the People’s Congress, the Al Eslah party affiliated to the Muslim Brotherhood, and the southern movement. The sooner they begin actual partnership to clearly define the status of constitutional institutions, the closer the county will get to stability and peace.
Reason, logic and balance of power prevent any party from monopolising power, hence the democratic model of political partnership is the solution to Yemen’s problems. Asking for external military help is not accepted by most Yemenis, as is clear from the decisive stance of the army to support Hadi and call on him to defend his country.
Gulf states can return to the scene through the auspices of the Yemeni dialogue, not by taking sides with any party even if there are reservations among some Yemeni parties about having Riyadh, Doha, Muscat and Kuwait as alternatives to a new bridge between the GCC and Yemen.
The obsession with Iran makes it difficult to figure out the equations of the shift in Yemen from the Gulf perspective, but Iranian expansion depends on the Gulf’s position. The GCC is supposed to learn from the lessons of Iraq, which was neglected and left prey to extremism and terrorism until the announcement of the creation of Islamic State. All this happened and the Gulf didn’t lift a finger.
The Iraqis resorted to Iran, and now they are reaping the fruits of defeating IS.
Despite Yemen’s internal contradictions, IS penetration in its south is liable to make the Gulf states the main supporters in its new era, which entails facing this organisation as one of their priorities, not for the sake of the Houthis or even to stop the Iranian influence, but to protect themselves from the spread of IS into their Yemeni backyard after it is expelled from Syria and Iraq.
The author is a political analyst
