CHAIRMAN: DR. KHALID BIN THANI AL THANI
EDITOR-IN-CHIEF: PROF. KHALID MUBARAK AL-SHAFI

Default / Miscellaneous

What to expect from the Iran nuclear talks

Published: 12 Mar 2015 - 04:37 am | Last Updated: 16 Jan 2022 - 06:28 pm

There is a lot of talk about Iran’s nuclear negotiations with the superpowers, its expected results and their impact on Iran’s internal affairs.
Perhaps the most important questions are: Will the outcome of the talks compensate Iran for the losses it has suffered over the past several years? Will they strengthen the Iranian regime or weaken it?

Great Satan
Iran frequently promotes its “hostile” position against the West and the United States, which it describes in its revolutionary literature as the Great Satan. Despite this, the US is a key player in the Iranian negotiations because of its global standing.
Iran is seeking an agreement with Washington, therefore a direct negotiating channel, mediated by Oman, was opened with Washington.
After several rounds of negotiations, Iran and the P5+1 group reached a tentative agreement in November 2013, which was later extended until November 2014. But they didn’t reach a comprehensive agreement by that deadline, therefore it was extended for seven months.
A new round of negotiations took place in Vienna on January 14 this year between the foreign ministers of Iran and America. The talks later moved to Geneva.
Another round of negotiations took place in Istanbul, Turkey, but without any substantial results.

Possible scenarios
There are three possible scenarios for the future of the nuclear negotiations:
1. The signing of a comprehensive agreement.
2. Failure of the negotiations.
3. The negotiations continue for a few more rounds after another interim agreement is adopted.
According to the information available, it seems that the third option is the most likely one, despite the fact that Tehran and Washington do not favour it.
This option will be seriously considered in the event of failure to reach a final agreement. It would be better than declaring that the talks have failed, which would strengthen hardliners in Iran and the US, which neither the Obama administration nor the Rowhani government want.
This option is also in the interest of the Revolutionary Guards and the subsidiaries of the Iranian military establishment, who control a large part of the Iranian economy, the oil trade and smuggling operations.
If a nuclear deal is signed, Iran may have to reconsider its foreign policy and the way it interacts with countries in the region. A deal may also dent Iran’s image in the eyes of its supporters in the region, since it has for long been hostile to the West, especially the United States.

Heroic flexibility
Official media close to Iran’s Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei has launched a media campaign against media outlets close to the Rowhani government.
They sharply criticised Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif after the publication of images showing him walking with his US counterpart in Geneva a few days after the terrorist attacks in Paris.
Khamenei’s official page commented on the picture, saying: “During a walk through the streets of Geneva, Zarif and Kerry’s feet fell on fake points.”
One of the main goals of this campaign is to create the perception that any final agreement was reached through Khamenei’s policy, known as “heroic flexibility”, and that any failure of the talks was due to “American arrogance.”
The International Investment Corporation, which includes the largest financial institutions in the world, has predicted that if the nuclear talks fail, the Iranian economy will sink.
In a report published last December, it said the Iranian economy was expected to be “paralysed” due to the Western sanctions. Failure of the talks may also lead to imposition of new sanctions targeting the Iranian economy and Tehran’s oil exports.
According to the institution’s prediction, unemployment in Iran will jump fourfold within a year if the negotiations fail.
On the other hand, some experts believe that lifting of sanctions alone will not lead to economic prosperity and stability, since Iran needs to change its trade and business strategies and end government control over economic and financial activities.

Public anger
The hardliners ignore the fact that failure of the negotiations may accelerate the collapse of Iran’s economy. They are focusing on the downfall of Rowhani’s government, which has linked promises of economic progress to resolution of the nuclear issue.
In such an event, the Iranian public and the reformist movement will blame the government’s failure on the supreme leader. It could also rouse the anger of the general public, especially the youth, who voted for Rowhani in the 2013 presidential election to save the country from economic devastation and political isolation.
In other words, failure of the talks will be greeted with anger against Khamenei and the hardliners, especially the Revolutionary Guard, which could weaken the supreme leader’s position.
Nuclear referendum
In order to prevent such a failure, Rowhani threatened in a speech during an economic summit in Tehran on January 4 to seek the Iranian public’s approval in a referendum.
The threat to hold a referendum, in spite of the Rowhani government repeatedly affirming that the talks “are going according to the directives of the supreme leader”, shows that the popular majority is in favour of resolving the nuclear issue.
If Rowhani takes this step, which I doubt, it would weaken the position of Khamenei, who has the final say on all important matters, and it will reveal to the Iranian public who Khamenei really is, while strengthening Rowhani’s position.
Before the negotiations end, Iran will see more conflicts between the hardliners and moderates. This will increase pressure on Rowhani for having failed to fulfil any of the promises made to voters in mid-2013, especially the promises on resolving the nuclear issue, reducing unemployment, reining in prices and opening up to countries in the region.
The hardliners fear loss of popular support if Rowhani succeeds in resolving all internal and external issues.
In fact, the Iranian people have been the biggest losers in the conflicts since the revolution 36 years ago.
The author is a columnist and political analyst specialising in Iranian affairs