The visit of Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif to Saudi Arabia, where he met the Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques King Salman bin Abdulaziz, represents another step in Saudi diplomacy during the past few weeks.
First there were visits by kings, Emirs and Sheikhs of GCC countries, then a visit by Egyptian President Abdel Fattah Al Sisi, who was followed by Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan.
This is not mere coincidence, since the region is witnessing many developments, which allows us to conclude that there is something behind these visits.
Saudi-Pakistani relations have an Islamic and regional perspective. This special relationship is perhaps what piqued the curiosity of countries that are trying to dominate the region and wishing that this relationship wouldn’t exist.
Iran tops the list of these countries. Iran is often wary of alliances in which it doesn’t have a role. So it goes without saying that Iran seeks to prevent any alliance that will marginalise its regional role.
Iran fears the Saudi-Pakistani alliance for many reasons.
Pakistan can become a gateway for Saudi influence in the Central Asian countries that Tehran considers its backyard. These countries, which declared independence after the collapse of the Soviet Union, are close to Iran culturally and historically, but differ ethnically and religiously, as they are mostly Sunni Turks.
So, while these countries have cultural and historical ties with Iran, with Farsi being spoken in Tajikistan, from a sectarian perspective they are closer to Pakistan and Saudi Arabia. Ninety percent of the people in these countries, except in Azerbaijan, are Sunnis, and therefore they don’t trust Iranian influence in the region.
Moreover, Saudi Arabia can acquire economic and commercial clout in these countries by investing in development, tourism and industrial projects, which could affect Iranian influence there.
Moreover, Pakistan has huge manpower, a powerful military and nuclear weapons. The Iranian media often dwells on the fear that Saudi Arabia will get nuclear weapons from Pakistan.
This is why Iran fears a Saudi-Pakistani alliance, especially since Pakistan has a long border with Iran and it worries that it will have to counter Saudi influence on its eastern front, a region that poses major security and political challenges to the central government in Tehran. The Iranian regime believes that if it doesn’t stop interfering in the internal affairs of Gulf states Saudi Arabia may change its strategy and start doing the same in Iran.
Iran tries to hide its apprehension about an alliance between Riyadh and Islamabad, but often shows displeasure at any Pakistani support for the Gulf states.
For example, Iran expressed displeasure over the fact that Pakistani Foreign Minister Hina Rabbani had visited Riyadh in 2011 and 2013 and met high-ranking Saudi officials.
She also met prominent figures from other Gulf countries, including Bahrain, and spoke afterwards about the convergence of views of Pakistan and the Gulf states on developments in the region, especially events in Bahrain, and its support for the Bahraini government with regard to the intervention by the Peninsula Shield forces to maintain security in that country. She also expressed the former Pakistani government’s readiness to improve security cooperation with the Gulf countries to ensure security and stability in the region.
Iran is also trying to create hostility towards Saudi Arabia in Pakistan by inciting some groups close to Tehran to carry out marches against Saudi Arabia.
It is also working to establish pro-Iran groups in Pakistan that may be called the “Pakistani Hezbollah”, with the aim of exerting political and security pressures on Islamabad, particularly with regard to its relationship with the Gulf countries and its support for Arab causes. It also wants to counter Pakistani influence in Afghanistan, where Tehran is seeking political and economic dominance.
The fact is that Iran does not favour cooperation or solid relations between the Gulf states and a nuclear state like Pakistan. It annoys the Iranian government, which sees itself as the only regional power. It does not want to see the Gulf states in alliance with any other regional entity, particularly the neighbour on its eastern flank, a region where Iran has major security concerns.
The political conditions and developments in the region require the Gulf countries, Saudi Arabia in particular, to work for closer relationships with Pakistan and the Central Asian states.
The Arab region has witnessed an expansion of Iranian influence over the past few years, which has whetted Tehran’s appetite for further expansion.
Diplomatic and political work and the use of soft power in Pakistan and Central Asia will contribute to forcing Iran to retreat and shift from an offensive to a defensive mode in the region.
The author is a columnist and political analyst specialising in Iranian affairs
