Ahead of his recent visit to Riyadh, Egyptian President Abdel Fattah Al Sisi proposed the establishment of a joint Arab force. Before that, he had embraced with remarkable quietness what he calls a political solution in Syria.
On close observation, it becomes obvious that they are two different issues. There is absolutely no relation between them and they cannot be part of one plan of action.
From Sisi’s words, it appears that each contradicts the other. The political solution aims to avoid the use of force because of the complexity of the Syrian situation. However, the idea of a joint force may require abandoning the political solution and resorting to the use of force, if necessary.
To explain the subject further, the president’s proposal for a joint Arab force is extremely vague. What are the limits and goals of this force? Who are its targets?
The president said that it would be purely defensive, and it would not target any regional state. At the same time, we understand from Sisi’s words that the main, and perhaps only target, is terrorism.
During an interview with the Middle East newspaper, Sisi was asked about how to confront Islamic State (IS). He replied: “We have the ability to form a powerful force with a meaningful message, telling those seeking to harm us that we cannot be defeated when united.”
The meaning of “those seeking to harm us“ is ambiguous. Who is intended here? The president said further: “The terrorists will not be able to harm us unless we are disunited.” Therefore, we understand from his last statement that terrorists are the ones seeking to harm us and the only target of the joint force is terrorism.
Well, which kind of terrorism are we talking about here? Is it the Sunni terrorism targeted by the US-led coalition? Or is it Shia terrorism? What will the relationship between the proposed Arab force and the international coalition be against IS?
I think Shia terrorism is not on Sisi’s mind, since all his speeches focused on IS, the Libyan situation and terrorism in Sinai.
On the other hand, the president ruled out any solution in Syria except a political resolution. He rarely mentions Iraq and Yemen. The same goes for the Iranian role in the region, especially in Iraq and Syria.
In contrast, Sisi frequently talks about Sinai, Libya and the security of the Arabian Gulf. All this indicates that the joint Arab force is not meant to deal with the situations in Iraq, Syria and Yemen, but with Sinai, Libya and what the Gulf states could be subjected to.
What about the Iranian presence in Yemen and in the Gulf’s vicinity? This is also missing in the president’s conversations. He also doesn’t talk about the dangerous militias in the region funded and trained by Iran.
When President Sisi was directly asked by the Middle East newspaper “how he sees his relationship with Tehran,” he avoided the issue completely, and focused only on the security of the Gulf.
What can be deduced from all this? The Libyan situation is the first and foremost issue behind Sisi’s idea of a joint force. If this is true, it is only another mechanism to help Egypt secure an Arab cover for its expected role in Libya.
This reminds us of an earlier joint Arab force in Lebanon in the seventies. What happened to it? Yes, Egypt is not Syria, and Libya is not Lebanon, and the circumstances were different then, but Sisi’s speech ended with a vague idea without disclosing its objectives and limitations.
This Arab proposal is without a political programme or a clear strategy that takes into account the interests of all the countries concerned.
Egypt, like America and all the Arab countries, seems to be concerned with Sunni terrorism, which threatens the regime, ignoring the fact that both Shia and Sunni terrorism threaten the state before they threaten the regime.
It is important here to recall an incident directly related to this issue. Egypt, on two occasions, sent troops to protect Kuwait from Iraqi threats. This happened during the reigns of Gamal Abdel Nasser, in 1961, and Hosni Mubarak, in 1990.
Now, Egypt is quiet in the face of the military, political and intelligence incursions by Iran in Iraq, Syria, Lebanon and Yemen. In such a case, what is meant by the statement, “security of the Gulf is an Egyptian red line”?
Terrorism and Iran are the main source of danger not only in the Persian Gulf but also in the Arab world as a whole. Was the Iraqi aspiration to expand during the leftist reign of Abdul Karim Qassem and the Baathist reign of Saddam Hussein more dangerous to the security of Egypt than the expansion of Iran in the era of the mullahs and the mandate of the faqih (jurist)?
Are Iraq and Syria’s security and sovereignty less important for Egypt than the Gulf’s security and sovereignty? Egypt’s security starts from the Levant, and the security of the Arabian Peninsula and Gulf is an extension of the security of Mesopotamia and the Levant.
Taking the aforementioned facts into consideration, why does Cairo seem more understanding, unhurried and calm in the face of the Iranian expansion than it was against Iraq’s ambitions in the last century? How does one explain this?
Coming to the idea of a political solution in Syria, we face the same uncertainty and confusion. Talk of a political solution in Syria is no more than beautiful words after all the bloodshed and destruction. What for?
The general statement doesn’t offer a clear vision or an answer; not even the ingredients of a solution. What is the political solution envisioned by Sisi? The most he said to the Middle East newspaper was: “The meaning of a peaceful political solution is for everyone’s benefit and not for the benefit of a single party. What I mean is that the opposition and the regime should find a real way out, and then we may start tackling the dangerous issues that affect Arab security.”
The problem is that the Syrian regime does not consider the other parties equal to it to even accept such a solution. This leaves us with two issues that the Egyptian president is unaware of.
The first is that the Syrian regime was not and will not be part of a political solution. It is a closed sectarian family system based on — especially during the era of Bashar Al Assad — the principle of forming a minority alliance in Syria and the region. Therefore any political solution that does not take that into account threatens to destroy the very nature of this regime from its roots.
Both Kofi Annan and Lakhdar Brahimi tried to find a peaceful political solution in Syria and failed. UN envoy Staffan de Mistura was modest enough to broach the idea of a ceasefire only in Aleppo.
The second issue that makes a political solution impossible is that Iran supports the Syrian regime militarily, financially and politically, and is a party to deciding whether to accept or reject any solution because Assad’s government is isolated regionally and internationally and can no longer exclusively decide on any matter concerning it.
Is Sisi aware of the magnitude of the political, financial, military and human investment that Iran has made in Syria? Does he think Tehran will accept a political solution that ends its control over Syria? And will the Syrian regime accept a solution that “ensures everyone’s interests” after refusing it for more than four years?
In other words, is there a possibility of a political solution in Syria without removing all these obstacles, which are preventing such an option?
These obstacles were allowed to grow with regional and international support. Egypt was one of the contributors during the rule of the Muslim Brotherhood and even after the army took control again.
They can be removed only by rebalancing the military powers of the parties who have an interest in this solution.
Being courteous to Iran for whatever reason won’t help achieve the solution the Egyptian president is looking for. Could it be that Sisi doesn’t see a political solution in Syria but only wishes to buy time with such a proposal?
The author is an academic, a columnist and a political analyst
