Vance Serchuk
By Vance Serchuk
The coalition of Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe won a majority of seats in the upper house of parliament on Sunday, consolidating Abe’s unlikely political comeback and ending the procession of weak, unstable governments in Tokyo inaugurated during his own first term in office six years ago. Abe’s victory means that US policymakers finally have a pro-American partner in Japan who is capable of making tough decisions at home and abroad, backed by a parliamentary majority that can keep him in power for several years.
Rather than welcoming this development, however, the Obama administration is widely perceived in Japan as being ambivalent about it. The problem appears to be Abe himself; specifically, his reputation as a right-wing nationalist with revisionist views about Japan’s wartime history.
The administration’s fear is not only that Abe will at some point pursue provocative policies, such as revisiting Japan’s past apologies for its wartime conduct. It’s also that, even in the absence of such actions, tensions between Japan and its neighbours risk festering under Abe — most troublingly with the other key US partner in the region, South Korea.
These are legitimate concerns. What’s unclear, however, is whether the Obama administration has a strategy to defuse them.
This is not the first time President Barack Obama has had to deal with the elected leader of an important ally, in a critical part of the world, whose cooperation on major national security challenges is essential but whose instincts and worldview he distrusts.
When Benjamin Netanyahu returned as Israel’s prime minister in March 2009, the Obama administration — recalling battles with him over the peace process during his first term in office in the 1990s — did little to disguise its doubts and misgivings about him. What followed was a protracted, unnecessary and counterproductive melodrama that convinced many Israelis that Obama lacked affection or sympathy for their country.
Eventually, the Obama administration recognised that its approach wasn’t working and that it needed to build a better personal relationship between the two leaders, as well as a broader rapport with Israeli society.
Abe’s performance over the past six months suggests that this shouldn’t be a diplomatic mission impossible. To his credit, the prime minister has governed as a forward-looking pragmatist, focused on resuscitating Japan’s economy rather than on relitigating its past. After Sunday’s election, the odds are good that his agenda will remain mostly positive and pragmatic, with the bulk of his political capital needed to push the structural reforms necessary for Japan’s revitalisation, including US priorities such as the Trans-Pacific Partnership trade pact.
Ultimately, working with Abe will inevitably involve its share of frictions and frustrations. But that is also part and parcel of making an alliance work. Whatever the challenges, it’s worth recognising that a strong and confident Japan with which we occasionally disagree is vastly preferable to a weak and dysfunctional Japan. The former is a manageable challenge. The latter is a potentially catastrophic threat to the US’ strategic position in Asia.
WP-BLOOMBERG
By Vance Serchuk
The coalition of Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe won a majority of seats in the upper house of parliament on Sunday, consolidating Abe’s unlikely political comeback and ending the procession of weak, unstable governments in Tokyo inaugurated during his own first term in office six years ago. Abe’s victory means that US policymakers finally have a pro-American partner in Japan who is capable of making tough decisions at home and abroad, backed by a parliamentary majority that can keep him in power for several years.
Rather than welcoming this development, however, the Obama administration is widely perceived in Japan as being ambivalent about it. The problem appears to be Abe himself; specifically, his reputation as a right-wing nationalist with revisionist views about Japan’s wartime history.
The administration’s fear is not only that Abe will at some point pursue provocative policies, such as revisiting Japan’s past apologies for its wartime conduct. It’s also that, even in the absence of such actions, tensions between Japan and its neighbours risk festering under Abe — most troublingly with the other key US partner in the region, South Korea.
These are legitimate concerns. What’s unclear, however, is whether the Obama administration has a strategy to defuse them.
This is not the first time President Barack Obama has had to deal with the elected leader of an important ally, in a critical part of the world, whose cooperation on major national security challenges is essential but whose instincts and worldview he distrusts.
When Benjamin Netanyahu returned as Israel’s prime minister in March 2009, the Obama administration — recalling battles with him over the peace process during his first term in office in the 1990s — did little to disguise its doubts and misgivings about him. What followed was a protracted, unnecessary and counterproductive melodrama that convinced many Israelis that Obama lacked affection or sympathy for their country.
Eventually, the Obama administration recognised that its approach wasn’t working and that it needed to build a better personal relationship between the two leaders, as well as a broader rapport with Israeli society.
Abe’s performance over the past six months suggests that this shouldn’t be a diplomatic mission impossible. To his credit, the prime minister has governed as a forward-looking pragmatist, focused on resuscitating Japan’s economy rather than on relitigating its past. After Sunday’s election, the odds are good that his agenda will remain mostly positive and pragmatic, with the bulk of his political capital needed to push the structural reforms necessary for Japan’s revitalisation, including US priorities such as the Trans-Pacific Partnership trade pact.
Ultimately, working with Abe will inevitably involve its share of frictions and frustrations. But that is also part and parcel of making an alliance work. Whatever the challenges, it’s worth recognising that a strong and confident Japan with which we occasionally disagree is vastly preferable to a weak and dysfunctional Japan. The former is a manageable challenge. The latter is a potentially catastrophic threat to the US’ strategic position in Asia.
WP-BLOOMBERG
