Dr Khalid Al Dakhil
Iran succeeded in imposing sectarian discourse on the region. To begin with, it has adopted a sectarian project and has been recruiting sectarian militias as a means to complement its mission.
Both the project and the means are the basis of Iran’s regional role. On the other hand, and as expected, the expansion of this role provoked the other side ideologically. Therefore, the combination of action and reaction reproduced militias as an alternative for the State, propagating sectarian rhetoric as an alternative for the State’s discourse.
The question is: Why did Iran succeed in imposing this dark reality on the region? I will return to this question later.
Prior to that, we must deal with an important question recently raised by TV host Dawood
Al Shirian, who was inspired by this gloomy certainty. The question: Should we continue or stop the sectarian debate?
There are two answers according to Al Shirian: the first says that “getting involved in sectarian conflicts is a service for the states and parties that are managing them by using religious slogans.” Therefore, we are supposed to “make them miss this opportunity and hold back on this kind of debate.”
The second answer says that “the dominators of this domain are sectarian-driven and abstinence from indulging in such a debate is not the solution. It is necessary to expose the case on both sides in order to confront it with an alternative.”
While comparing the two answers, Al Shirian concludes that the first one is the best and most effective. Why? Because we are “in front of a heyday and influence of political parties, groups and movements that are supported by countries and intelligence agencies, which have been trying for decades to propagate religious and sectarian divides among the people of this region.”
Therefore, “engaging in a discussion to expose this project will only exacerbate the problem by fuelling the feelings of the people and inducing them to a more sectarian line-up.”
Al Shirian’s goal is clear: to make the owners of sectarian projects and propositions miss the opportunity to continue. Anyone who recognises the danger of this scourge cannot help but agree with this noble objective.
However, to reach that goal, does it require participation in sectarian discussions, or fight the sectarian rhetoric on both sides with a completely reciprocating speech? The correct answer to the first part of the question according to Al Shirian is to absolutely avoid sectarian debates or controversies.
First, because choosing a doctrine over another forms the right to freedom of belief of each individual. Second, more than 1,400 years of controversy has proved that not much will change in the positions of the two parties. Third, sects or denominations are after all an extension of the reality of pluralism in society.
This diversity of thought or political view could have taken a direction far from religious sectarianism. However, the dominance of religious thought and the link between religion and State for many centuries has presumably led to the reality that we
are in.
In 1979, a religious State was born, namely Iran, which wants to employ this Arab sectarian reality to extend its influence and impose its options.
The results of this development and its aftershocks are now clear: Iran is occupying Syria, and it has an overwhelming influence in Iraq and Lebanon. It has sectarian militias throughout the Arab world that surpass the Arab countries in number. In parallel, there are rampant sectarian discourses, some are public and direct while others are concealed; most are available for everyone to listen to.
Putting the matter in this way indicates that Al Shirian’s question has a continuation. It is true that debating sectarianism makes things worse, but this is not the only option to avoid this outcome. There is no longer any justification for fear of provoking sectarian rhetoric, which does not need further aggravation.
It has established itself as a dominant discourse through the latest developments, wars, militias’ warfare, and media on both sides. Even school textbooks contribute to this phenomenon.
Therefore, it is a fatal mistake to allow this discourse to ravage the region and deepen the cracks and divisions among its people. Certainly, my friend Al Shirian does not want this to happen, and I agree with him that it is imperative for both Sunnis and Shias to confront it with an alternative speech, which is contrary to spirit, structure, and goal of sectarianism.
A discourse that reveals sectarian glare and gravity, and readjusts human views back to normal as a human being first and a citizen second, not an ideological being who returns in essence to his doctrine or sect. How can this be achieved without dismantling sectarian rhetoric and revealing its sources, means and goals?
This brings us back to the question: How did Iran succeed? It did not succeed with its own capabilities or the relevance of its project and its acceptability in the Arab street. This is clear from the rejection of the project by the silent majority and the spread of the phenomenon of the Sunni militia as a reaction to Iran’s expansion and its militias.
Iran was successful for other reasons, the most important of which is that sectarianism remained, with faltering Arab State project, a living part of the heritage of the area capable of being awakened if the motives and circumstances are available.
Second, the Arab countries did not launch a counter-Iranian sectarian project. The absence of the project, laced with sectarian heritage and a stumbled State, created a vacuum that Iran has been able to penetrate, and with it the phenomenon of infiltrated militias and sectarian discourse.
Pre-Syrian revolution, it is not surprising in this context that Iran has been able to confuse the already confused Arab World through the lie of resistance and opposition, a result of the perplexity of the State project.
Fortunately, Iran is the only State that is based on a religious doctrine, and it is officially building the militia mechanism as a lever to its regional role. Arab countries differ in that they are not religious countries, but are linked to religion politically and not constitutionally. Thus, they are not held hostage by sectarian thought.
Turkey, another non-Arab Islamic state, differs from Iran in that it is neither a religious nor a sectarian state. Contrary to Iran, Turkey did not make the starting point of the Sunni majority to prevail its sect over the national identity. It is simply a nationalistic secular state that has a Sunni majority.
As for Iran, it considers itself a Shia religious state based on a Shia majority. From here, the Turkish role is different from the Iranian one, in that it deals with the countries of the region on this basis, and does not adopt, as Iran does, the idea of supporting militias for its regional role.
From this angle appears the problematic sectarian rhetoric in the region. Al Shirian’s fear from the caveats of facing it stems not from the discourse itself but from the duration of the religion’s association with the State and the absence of an Arab anti-sectarian project. The first makes religion a political project and a sectarian tool for it. The second creates a vacuum for the project’s expansion. What is required in the Arab case, as I pointed out before, is the dismantling of sectarian rhetoric and replacing it with a counter alternative, perhaps paving the way for a project in the same direction that the State
will adopt.
In this regional circumstance, Saudi Arabia by its spiritual centrality, strategic location, political clout, and new leadership is eligible to take on this initiative and thrust it at the regional level.
If the Arab world is suffering from a vacuum that reached a point where militias contend with the state and the sectarian rhetoric competes with the State’s discourse, then the State has to restore its unopposed centrality and the prestige of its discourse.
The writer is an academician, columnist and political analyst.
