Although a surprise, the Saudi response to Iranian activities in Yemen is in line with the typical behaviour of countries at times of crises, which is to resort to force when they are unable to protect their interests by other means. When a conflict develops into a substantial threat to the interests of one party and indirect war does not suffice, there must be direct military intervention.
That’s what Iran did in Iraq after the Islamic State (IS) seized Mosul and most of the country’s northwest, and that is what Iran is also doing in Syria for nearly three years. In Yemen, the threat was not only to the interests of the Arab Gulf states but also to their very existence, and they were kind of late to react.
Certainly, if the Gulf Arab states had successfully run an indirect war with Iran, which has eaten up their external security perimeter piece by piece and state after state, they wouldn’t have had to move to defend themselves in the face of Iranian encroachment in Yemen. Iran is driven by imperial dreams and missionary policies. The Saudi intervention came as a surprise to many, mainly Iran and its allies in Yemen.
There is a prevailing impression that Gulf states, especially Saudi Arabia, lack the administration or the will, or both, to enter into a direct military confrontation with their opponents, who have a high degree of determination, over a tiny state like Yemen that is a little larger than half a million square kilometres.
Gulf states are often stereotyped as vulnerable, helpless and reliant on Western or Arab protection in confronting Iran. The United States of America, however, seems preoccupied with the nuclear negotiations with Iran.
The Arabs were prompted by the collapse of Iraq and Syria and the erosion of Egypt’s regional role. In addition, the Peninsula Shield forces had intervened in Bahrain in early 2011 to support the regime against an uprising backed by Iran. However, Bahrain’s case is irrelevant because it is only as big as a small town in Saudi Arabia.
So from where did the determination to launch a military operation in Yemen come?
The death of King Abdullah marked a turning point in Saudi policy, since the Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques King Salman bin Abdulaziz seems more dynamic and more willing than his late brother to counter Iranian expansion, which is about to tighten its fist over Saudi Arabia from the north through Iraq and Syria, and from the south through Yemen.
As soon as he had finished with settling internal and royal family matters, the new king dedicated himself to rearranging the foreign affairs of his country, and re-evaluated the risks and threats it faced.
Hence, the declared hostility towards the Muslim Brotherhood has been toned down, and Iran came to top the list of threats that Saudi Arabia and the other Gulf states faced.
In less than a month, King Salman regained old allies that Saudi Arabia had lost for no compelling reason. He received in Riyadh Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan and Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif. King Salman sent a message to Sudanese President Omar Hassan Al Bashir, inviting him to a meeting a day before the launch of Operation Decisive Storm against the Houthis. Saudi Arabia had refused to receive Al Bashir for many years because of his relations with Iran.
Al Bashir’s visit to Riyadh yielded results as he declared a break in ties with former Yemeni president Ali Abdullah Saleh and the closure of Iranian liaison offices in Sudan. In addition, Al Bashir announced that Sudan would join the alliance formed by Saudi Arabia for military action in Yemen.
After arranging his country’s foreign relations, King Salman called for a meeting on March 21 in his palace in the Auja area of Dir’iya, the historic capital of the Saud family on the outskirts of Riyadh.
At this meeting, attended by senior officials from all Gulf Arab states except Oman, a plan to move ahead was finalised. This included giving priority to political and diplomatic action for resolving the crisis in Yemen and relaunching the dialogue.
Doha was suggested as an alternative venue to Riyadh for talks. The Houthis and former president Saleh refused to resume the political process that was stopped when the Houthis seized the presidential palace in Sana’a by force last January. The alternative plan was to respond to the call by President Abdrabuh Mansur Hadi to intervene.
This plan had been proposed by Saudi Foreign Minister Saud Al Faisal, who alerted the GCC countries after the Auja meeting that they needed to take steps to stop the aggression against Yemen in case political moves failed.
Saudi Arabia began mobilising its forces along the southern border with Yemen before King Salman launched Operation Decisive Storm at midnight the next day, March 26, 2015.
Saudi military action was accompanied by a remarkable diplomatic move, as Riyadh announced the launch of the operation through its ambassador in Washington. This aimed to show that it was coordinated with the Obama administration. But it seems the White House was not informed in advance.
The Obama administration looked confused announcing that it was aware of the military operation and was providing logistical and intelligence support for it. However, America announced that it won’t participate in the operation. The White House was quick to emphasise that its main concern in Yemen was its war against Al Qaeda.
The US is trying to reconcile two contradictory goals, the first being not to provoke the Iranians in a way that affects the nuclear negotiations, which have reached a sensitive phase, and the second being not to upset the Saudis, their main ally in the war on IS, and let them feel betrayed in the light of growing doubts about America’s commitment to its allies.
Clearly, the Gulf Arab states, especially Saudi Arabia, are no longer in a position to condone Iranian actions that threaten their very existence. At the same time, they are taking deliberate steps as they face, for the first time in history, threats that cannot be overlooked and a war that nobody can fight on behalf of the Arabs.
The Gulf states should not allow Iran and its allies in Yemen to engage them in a war of attrition, as that would be a fatal mistake. In this context, one need only recall the experience of the United States in Vietnam and Iraq and of Russia in Afghanistan.
Therefore, the Saudis — who know very well the nature of the Yemenis and put an end to Gamal Abdel Nasser’s intervention in Yemen and destroyed his image — should adhere to the goal of supporting Hadi and repair the alliances damaged in the years following the revolution and create a fighting force capable of countering Houthi-Iranian plans.
The Saudis should provide sufficient support for the military operation by giving air cover and be ready to confront any Iranian interference on a large scale.
This should be done until the Houthis lose hope of receiving any external support and respond to calls to accept the GCC initiative for a political solution.
The author is a columnist and academic researcher
