Brian Fishman
By Brian Fishman
As soon as peaceful protests against Syrian President Bashar Assad turned violent in summer 2011, it was clear that Al Qaeda’s affiliate in Iraq — known as the Islamic State of Iraq (ISI) — would play a terrible role shaping Syria’s future. That reality was re-emphasised on April 9, when ISI leader Abu Bakr Al Baghdadi publicly acknowledged that his organisation had founded the Syrian jihadi group, Jabhat Al Nusra. He then renamed their collective enterprise, the Islamic State of Iraq and Greater Syria (ISIGS).
Kudos to Baghdadi for confirming what has long been known. The US had already listed Al Nusra as an alias for Al Qaeda in Iraq in December 2012, and the basic relationship between the Iraqi and Syrian branches of Al Qaeda was easy to surmise when Al Nusra officially declared its existence in January 2012.
It’s no surprise ISI was quickly able to establish a foothold in Syria: The group had built extensive networks in the country since early in the Iraq war, and was reasserting itself in eastern Iraq, which shares a 376-mile border with Syria, in the years before the uprising against Assad began.
The relevant issue, then, is not whether Baghdadi’s statement is true. Rather, the important questions to ask are who made the branding decision, why the ISI acknowledged this relationship now, and whether the announcement will lead to changes in behaviour by the jihadist group. In Syria, the looming question is how Al Nusra’s open affiliation with Al Qaeda will affect its relationships with other rebel groups fighting against Assad.
Perhaps the most interesting conclusion to be drawn from the creation of the ISIGS is that Ayman Al Zawahiri, Al Qaeda’s titular head, still seems to be engaged in the operations of the terror group’s regional affiliates. The co-branding of the ISI and Jabhat Al-Nusra was preceded on April 7 by an audio statement from Zawahiri urging Jabhat al-Nusra to establish an Islamic state and emphasizing the importance of the Iraqi branch of Al Qaeda to that effort.
Baghdadi’s subsequent declaration of unity — only a day or so later — suggests either a high-degree of coordination with Zawahiri’s PR team, or that he jumps quickly when the head man gives an order.
Zawahiri’s apparent ability to affect Al Qaeda’s strategy in the Levant is somewhat surprising. In the wake of Osama bin Laden’s death, he is the world’s most wanted man, and a series of US strikes on Al Qaeda’s communication network after the bin Laden raid must have forced him deeper underground. Nonetheless, it is very hard to believe that the timing of the Zawahiri and Baghdadi statements are a coincidence. It seems that Zawahiri — like bin Laden before him — remains relevant to the operations of the network he heads.
But if Zawahiri’s continuing influence has been clarified, his judgment remains suspect. It wouldn’t be the first time he botched the terror group’s strategy in the region: In June 2006, he urged Al Qaeda in Iraq to declare an Islamic state in a eulogy for the group’s slain leader, Abu Musab Al Zarqawi. At the time, Zawahiri was worried that a precipitous US withdrawal from Iraq would lead to internecine fighting among Iraq’s Sunnis, similar to the environment among Afghan mujahidin after the Soviet withdrawal in 1988. Zawahiri’s diagnosis may well have been accurate, but his prescription of an Islamic state was a disaster for the Al Qaeda affiliate. The group tried to tighten its grip on governance, and in doing so hastened the Sunni backlash known as the Awakening movement, a breakdown that was also facilitated by extreme pressure on the Al Qaeda network by US forces.
Considering Zawahiri’s previous strategic thinking, it is easy to wonder whether his reasoning is similar when it comes to Syria. Perhaps the Al Qaeda leader envisions that Al Nusra and the ISI can forge a governing framework that will allow them to supplant their rivals in the rebel movement after Assad falls?
The answer may be simpler: Al Qaeda’s role in Al Nusra is now widely acknowledged, making hiding behind localised branding no longer feasible. Considering that reality, it makes sense that the ISI — which fundamentally rejects the legitimacy of existing borders in the Middle East — would broaden its overt claim on territory, including parts of Syria.
The public unification of the ISI and Al Nusra may not be universally popular — especially among Syrian recruits who were attracted primarily by the group’s military and organisational effectiveness, rather than its ideology. That may explain Al Nusra leader Abu Muhammad Al Jolani’s disjointed statement released on April 10, in which he affirmed his allegiance to Zawahiri but rejected the idea of renaming Al Nusra and reassured supporters that the group’s operations would not change.
Whatever Zawahiri’s rationale, this declaration carries risks for Al Qaeda’s operation in Syria. In Iraq, the ISI earned a reputation — even among the Sunni population — as brutal and domineering. Al Nusra has avoided some of those mistakes in the past year by collaborating with a range of Syrian militant groups, and has also effectively delivered specific services. But the declaration of an Islamic state will carry with it certain expectations from Al Qaeda’s jihadi supporters, as it did seven years ago in Iraq. One of those expectations is that the group will exercise control over territory — and that will mean confronting tribal groups and other Syrian rebels that may not be on board with Al Nusra’s extremist vision. For better or worse, the reckoning between Al Qaeda’s Syria affiliate and other rebels groups is beginning.
WP_Bloomberg
By Brian Fishman
As soon as peaceful protests against Syrian President Bashar Assad turned violent in summer 2011, it was clear that Al Qaeda’s affiliate in Iraq — known as the Islamic State of Iraq (ISI) — would play a terrible role shaping Syria’s future. That reality was re-emphasised on April 9, when ISI leader Abu Bakr Al Baghdadi publicly acknowledged that his organisation had founded the Syrian jihadi group, Jabhat Al Nusra. He then renamed their collective enterprise, the Islamic State of Iraq and Greater Syria (ISIGS).
Kudos to Baghdadi for confirming what has long been known. The US had already listed Al Nusra as an alias for Al Qaeda in Iraq in December 2012, and the basic relationship between the Iraqi and Syrian branches of Al Qaeda was easy to surmise when Al Nusra officially declared its existence in January 2012.
It’s no surprise ISI was quickly able to establish a foothold in Syria: The group had built extensive networks in the country since early in the Iraq war, and was reasserting itself in eastern Iraq, which shares a 376-mile border with Syria, in the years before the uprising against Assad began.
The relevant issue, then, is not whether Baghdadi’s statement is true. Rather, the important questions to ask are who made the branding decision, why the ISI acknowledged this relationship now, and whether the announcement will lead to changes in behaviour by the jihadist group. In Syria, the looming question is how Al Nusra’s open affiliation with Al Qaeda will affect its relationships with other rebel groups fighting against Assad.
Perhaps the most interesting conclusion to be drawn from the creation of the ISIGS is that Ayman Al Zawahiri, Al Qaeda’s titular head, still seems to be engaged in the operations of the terror group’s regional affiliates. The co-branding of the ISI and Jabhat Al-Nusra was preceded on April 7 by an audio statement from Zawahiri urging Jabhat al-Nusra to establish an Islamic state and emphasizing the importance of the Iraqi branch of Al Qaeda to that effort.
Baghdadi’s subsequent declaration of unity — only a day or so later — suggests either a high-degree of coordination with Zawahiri’s PR team, or that he jumps quickly when the head man gives an order.
Zawahiri’s apparent ability to affect Al Qaeda’s strategy in the Levant is somewhat surprising. In the wake of Osama bin Laden’s death, he is the world’s most wanted man, and a series of US strikes on Al Qaeda’s communication network after the bin Laden raid must have forced him deeper underground. Nonetheless, it is very hard to believe that the timing of the Zawahiri and Baghdadi statements are a coincidence. It seems that Zawahiri — like bin Laden before him — remains relevant to the operations of the network he heads.
But if Zawahiri’s continuing influence has been clarified, his judgment remains suspect. It wouldn’t be the first time he botched the terror group’s strategy in the region: In June 2006, he urged Al Qaeda in Iraq to declare an Islamic state in a eulogy for the group’s slain leader, Abu Musab Al Zarqawi. At the time, Zawahiri was worried that a precipitous US withdrawal from Iraq would lead to internecine fighting among Iraq’s Sunnis, similar to the environment among Afghan mujahidin after the Soviet withdrawal in 1988. Zawahiri’s diagnosis may well have been accurate, but his prescription of an Islamic state was a disaster for the Al Qaeda affiliate. The group tried to tighten its grip on governance, and in doing so hastened the Sunni backlash known as the Awakening movement, a breakdown that was also facilitated by extreme pressure on the Al Qaeda network by US forces.
Considering Zawahiri’s previous strategic thinking, it is easy to wonder whether his reasoning is similar when it comes to Syria. Perhaps the Al Qaeda leader envisions that Al Nusra and the ISI can forge a governing framework that will allow them to supplant their rivals in the rebel movement after Assad falls?
The answer may be simpler: Al Qaeda’s role in Al Nusra is now widely acknowledged, making hiding behind localised branding no longer feasible. Considering that reality, it makes sense that the ISI — which fundamentally rejects the legitimacy of existing borders in the Middle East — would broaden its overt claim on territory, including parts of Syria.
The public unification of the ISI and Al Nusra may not be universally popular — especially among Syrian recruits who were attracted primarily by the group’s military and organisational effectiveness, rather than its ideology. That may explain Al Nusra leader Abu Muhammad Al Jolani’s disjointed statement released on April 10, in which he affirmed his allegiance to Zawahiri but rejected the idea of renaming Al Nusra and reassured supporters that the group’s operations would not change.
Whatever Zawahiri’s rationale, this declaration carries risks for Al Qaeda’s operation in Syria. In Iraq, the ISI earned a reputation — even among the Sunni population — as brutal and domineering. Al Nusra has avoided some of those mistakes in the past year by collaborating with a range of Syrian militant groups, and has also effectively delivered specific services. But the declaration of an Islamic state will carry with it certain expectations from Al Qaeda’s jihadi supporters, as it did seven years ago in Iraq. One of those expectations is that the group will exercise control over territory — and that will mean confronting tribal groups and other Syrian rebels that may not be on board with Al Nusra’s extremist vision. For better or worse, the reckoning between Al Qaeda’s Syria affiliate and other rebels groups is beginning.
WP_Bloomberg
